Revelations surfaced publicly in November 2011 that unknown hackers had over 2007-8 breached the command links to both Landsat 7, and NASA's Terra EOS AM-1, and, on June 20, 2008 "achieved all steps required to command" Terra. In February 2012, NASA reported to U.S. Congress a list of pervasive and deep-seated cybersecurity problems, confirming that hackers had gained access to and downloaded sensitive data from several of the agency's major centers. While attention on satellite security currently and rightly focuses more traditional threats to space systems, the issue of cyber security is now a major concern. Following a summary of some of the main suspected cases of known significant cyber attacks on several space agencies, highlighting the findings of the NASA report, this paper shows that sophisticated APTs are presenting a new and major threat to data assurance and space systems and analyses the response of NASA, ESA and JAXA to the issue, concluding that cyber security concerns are presenting new challenges and forcing new policy initiatives by space asset holders.
Introduction
This paper was primarily stimulated by the work of Jan Kallberg and his article "Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2012 and the growing issue of cybersecurity threats that space agencies and operators face. This paper is the first, to the author's knowledge, to compare the experiences and policies of three different major civilian space agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) in discussing cyber security and space security issues.
Cyber Attacks on Space Agencies
In November 2011 the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission reported that over 2007-8 the command links to both Landsat 7, and NASA's Terra EOS AM-1 had been penetrated by cyberattacks, agents unknown, and, on June 20, 2008 "achieved all steps required to command" Terra. In February 2012, NASA reported to U.S. Congress a list of pervasive and deep-seated cybersecurity problems, including 5,408 computer security incidents, the fact that only 1% of NASA's laptops were encrypted, and that hackers had gained access to and downloaded sensitive data from several of the agency's major centers.
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Findings of the NASA report
In Testimony before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, February 29, 2012 on NASA Cybersecurity, Paul K. Martin, Inspector General National Aeronautics and Space Administration, identified a series of serious issues with NASA's IT governance.
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The report noted a wide range of areas for NASA to improve its cybersecurity policy and practice in the face of growing cyber threats. For example, it pointed to "significant weaknesses" that resulted in PCs and hard drives being sold or prepared for sale even though they still contained sensitive NASA, noting data on 10 PCs sold to the public that had failed sanitization testing, and that between April 2009 and April 2011, NASA reported the loss or theft of 48 Agency mobile computing devices, some of which resulted in the unauthorized release of sensitive data including export-controlled, Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and third-party intellectual property. The March 2011 theft of an unencrypted NASA notebook computer resulted in the loss of algorithms used to command and control the International Space Station, the report noted. Other lost or stolen notebook PCs contained sensitive data on NASA's Constellation and Orion programs.
The report also identified: (i) Systemic internal control weaknesses in NASA's IT security control monitoring and cybersecurity oversight;
(ii) That the Chief Information Officer (CIO) lacked visibility of and oversight authority for key NASA IT Assets and limited ability to direct NASA's Mission Directorates to fully implement CIO-recommended or mandated IT security programs (based on the fact that IT staff responsible for implementing security controls on mission IT assets report to the Mission Directorate and not the NASA CIO); (iii) "High-risk technical vulnerabilities" in NASA's mission support to manned and unmanned spacecraft; (iv) Failure by Directorates to consistently implement key IT security controls (one audit found only 24% of applicable PCs on a mission network monitored for critical software patches and 62% monitored for technical vulnerabilities and;
(v) "Significant weaknesses" in NASA's internal controls for sanitization and disposal of excess Shuttle IT equipment at four NASA Centers. The report also highlighted shortcomings in implementing continuous monitoring of IT security required by The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA).
The report noted that NASA needed to take significant steps to ensure its successful implementation of improved cyber security policy. On a positive note, the OIG found that NASA had completed 51 of 69 recommendations in IT audit reports over the last 5 years.
to a cyber intrusion at Goddard with information sent to servers in Russia (suspected remote access/control of satellite).
1997: NASA: malware reported as infecting major NASA centers stealing sensitive data.
As the list suggests, while attention on satellite security currently and rightly focuses more on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) orbital debris and kinetic impact issues, jamming, blinding and interference, the issue of cyber security, is becoming more prominent with the increased sophistication of attacks.
Cyber Threats and Cyberwar
Beyond attacks by individuals or groups of hackers and DDoS attacks to slow servers and websites, at least of the attacks suffered by NASA and perhaps the publicized attacks on JAXA, may fit the category of advanced cyber espionage of cyberwar. Cyber espionage is the act or practice of obtaining secrets from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, governments and enemies also for military, political, or economic advantage using illegal exploitation methods on internet, networks, software and/or computers. If cyber espionage is connected to a particular state or state authority, this can become an example of cyberwarfare, when cyberwarfare refers to politically motivated hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage.
If we can assume that many of the threats, defined by ISO 27005 as the "…potential cause of an incident, that may result in harm of systems and organization" were sophisticated enough to presume direct or indirect state involvement, then many of the attacks documented in this paper fit Richard A. Clarke's definition of cyberwar. In his book Cyber War (May 2010), cyberwar can be classified as "actions by a nation-state to o penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption." 3) Conversely, for example, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper divides cyberwar into cyber espionage and cyberattacks.
Cyber espionage & cyberwar
At least two attacks on NASA have been linked to largescale cyber espionage programs. One, Titan Rain, which ran from 2003, is credited informally to Chinese military hackers, saw infiltration Lockheed Martin Corporation, Sandia National Laboratories and the Redstone Arsenal, as well as NASA. Moonlight Maze running from 1998-9 is suspected to have been Russian in origin.
Operation Olympic, Stuxnet
Discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet is a complex worm that penetrated Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes. Different variants of Stuxnet targeted five Iranian organizations, with the probable target widely suspected to be uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran, which was subsequently damaged. While the U.S. and Israeli governments have not formally acknowledged their respective roles in U.S. in the design and release of Stuxnet, a 1 June 2012, an article in The New York Times identified Stuxnet is part of a U.S. and Israeli intelligence operation called "Operation Olympic Games" started under President George W. Bush and expanded under President Barack Obama. If true, this would be the first known case of inter-state cyberwar where the government of one nation specifically targeted the strategic military infrastructure of another and actually damaged it. In any case, Stuxnet graphically illustrates how it is now possible for one state to surreptitiously control or sabotage even the protected, air-gapped critical/ strategic infrastructure of another state.
The growing threat of APTs
In recent years, the nature of cyber threats has metastasized into an arms race between organizations and those who would like to breach IT networks led by the growth of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). APTs refer to groups, such as foreign governments, with both the capability and intent to persistently and effectively target a specific entity.
In February 2012 a U.S.-based cybersecurity consultancy, Mandiant Corporation, exposed the massive growth of cyber espionage spear phishing APTs, which it attributed to Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by an organization it labeled "APT1." It suspects APT1 is one of 20 groups associated with the PLA engaged in pervasive global cyber espionage programs, although the company maintains that while circumstantial evidence of state (i.e. PLA) involvement is strong, no absolute or conclusive direct link can be made.
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Mandiant found that APT1 had gained entry into at least 141 organizations spanning 20 industries stealing as much as with 6.5TB from one target over a 10-month period. In the first month of 2011, APT1 successfully compromised at least 17 new victims operating in 10 different high value industrial sectors. Controlling at a minimum 1,000 Command and Control (C2) servers, APT1's sophisticated spear phishing emails have been used since at least 2006 to steal broad categories of IP, including blueprints, process and production techniques, strategy, planning and other high-value and confidential data. APT1's masking techniques and had grown so sophisticated that APT1 will even reply within 20 minutes to queries of targeted individuals questioning the authenticity of mails, masquerading as the legitimate correspondent.
The report shows just by itself APT1 is known to have penetrated 115 organizations in the U.S., and one each in Mandiant said APT1's sophisticated methods in covering its tracks, other factors including the reluctance of targets to admit serious breaches, the time lapse between actual infiltration and discovery and the fact that APT1 is only one of 20 or more groups suspected of such activities in China alone mean that the report probably grossly underestimates the activities of APT1, one of 20 groups that may be associated with the PLA in conducting cyber espionage and/or cyberwar.
The case of NASA
The February 29, 2012 report mentioned above found that NASA has become the target of APTs, noting that in FY 2011, NASA reported it was the victim of 47 APTs, 13 of which successfully compromised NASA computers. It noted in one of the successful attacks, intruders stole credentials for more than 150 NASA employees, data that could have been used to gain unauthorized access to NASA systems. An ongoing investigation of another such attack at JPL involving Chinese-based Internet protocol (IP) addresses confirmed that the intruders gained full access to key JPL systems and sensitive user accounts.
The report also noted with full system access the intruders could: (1) modify, copy, or delete sensitive files; (2) add, modify, or delete user accounts for mission-critical JPL systems; (3) upload hacking tools to steal user credentials and compromise other NASA systems; and (4) modify system logs to conceal their actions. In other words, according to the report, the attackers had full functional control over these networks. The report noted that even after NASA fixes the vulnerability that permitted the attack to succeed, the attacker may covertly maintain a foothold inside NASA's system for future exploits.
Japan
Beginning with a July 2009 large-scale DDoS attack targeted against South Korean Internet services in conjunction with similar attacks against the United States, both Japan and Korea have been subject to a sharply increasing volume of APTs. For example, in August 2011, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries discovered viruses on its systems in 11 locations across Japan, finding 45 servers and 38 PCs were infected by at least eight types of viruses when employees unwittingly opened emails containing malware. IHI Corp. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, also major space, defense and engineering contractor also confirmed they had been targeted. In October that year it was revealed that the foreign ministry and several Japanese embassies had been under attack since June, as had Japan's Lower House.
The Cybersecurity and Economy Study Group Report of August 5, 2011 by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) noted waves of attacks specifically against Japan beginning September 2010 against high-value Japanese targets, including Government agencies noting a six-fold increase in sophisticated spear phishing attacks on leading corporations, research institutes and Government between 2007 and 2011. In 2011, such attacks accounted for one-third of all recorded attacks, with nearly 37% of APTs focused on on Japan's infrastructure, especially control systems such as those used in power plants and the manufacturing industry.
3.6.
U.S.-China economic and security review commission Two recent reports, "Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage," prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the other by the Commission itself note China as both a major cyber espionage and cyberwar threat, each pointing to a growing awareness of the importance of protecting space related assets.
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The first, the Annual Report to Congress of August 13, 2012 notes that U.S. industry and a range of government and military targets international organizations face repeated exploitation attempts by Chinese hackers of various stripes, citing a 2012 Trend Micro report highlight that released case studies on the China-linked campaigns that targeted government ministries, including military institutions in India and various military and industrial institutions in Japan. It also showed that in January 2012, security researchers identified an apparently China-based cyber espionage operation targeting a U.S. Department of Defense's network authentication standard. Directly pertinent to this paper, it called NASA's reporting of 47 APTs was the most disturbing example of what it called "malicious Chinese cyber activity."
The report called into question the integrity of the U.S.'s defense and telecommunications supply chains, noting that a 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation found numerous instances of suspect parts used in a variety of military systems and identified China as ''the dominant source country for counterfeit electronic parts that are infiltrating the defense supply chain," and asserting that malicious supply chain attacks have already taken place in the U.S.
In accordance with the growing sophistication of APTs, as noted in this paper, the Annual Report also pointed to the growing volume of exploitation attempts, calling China "the most threatening actor in cyberspace." It noted materials submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Samuel J. Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command stating that China's military is "building capability to target U.S. military space-based assets and computer networks using network and electronic warfare."
The report identified The Second Department of the PLA General Staff Department (2PLA) is responsible for military intelligence, the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (3PLA), responsible for signals intelligence and the Fourth Department of the PLA General Staff Department (4PLA) which engages in electronic warfare as actors in various elements of cyber espionage and warfare.
Aside from breaches at NASA, the report noted case studies showing the deliberate targeting of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program built by Lockheed Martin in conjunction with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems, and some 900 subcontractors, noting that Lockheed Martin officials reportedly acknowledged that six to eight F-35 subcontractors were "totally compromised" in 2009 alone.
The report identified increasingly advanced types of operations or operations against specialized targets with increased ability to defeat secure authentication, bridge ''air gaps,'' and target deployed platforms at sea and in space.
In conjunction the Annual Report, "Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage," noted that the PLA's strategic priority on creating modern command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure has catalyzed the development of an integrated information warfare (IW) capability both to defend China's military and civilian networks and seize control of an adversary's information systems, and that the PLA is focused on an IW strategy to achieve these goals.
Further the report stated that PLA is reintegrating its previous strategies to combine various kinetic, computer network operations (CNO), electronic, IW and psychological warfare strategies into a unified concept that integrates all elements of information warfare-electronic and non-electronic-offensive and defensive under a single command. It noted that this goal "has effectively created a new strategic and tactical high ground," and that China's growing capabilities to attack and degrade both critical infrastructure and military capabilities of technologically advanced nations poses "a more complex risk calculus" when considering the pros and cons of conflict, covert or overt, with China.
The report identified 3PLA and 4PLA as entities that will be responsible for directing cyber warfare at an adversary's logistics and C4ISR infrastructure in the event of conflict. Similarly to the Annual Report, the subsidiary report noted potential risks posed by the close relationship between the PLA and China's largest telecommunications hardware manufacturers to penetrate microelectronic supply chains U.S. military, civilian government, and high-value civilian industry such as defense and telecommunications through modification/tampering of semiconductors, microelectronics, routers, etc. to place logic bombs and back doors and malware into products.
Specifically for space, the report notes that joint PLA and civilian research into Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Exploitation tools and techniques may provide a more advanced means to penetrate unclassified networks supporting U.S. satellite ground stations and that as part of PLA's focus on seizing information control of adversary C4ISR systems, the 4PLA's primary research institutes have supported work on GPS jamming, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System countermeasures, jamming of frequency ranges associated with communication satellites commonly used by Western militaries, and synthetic aperture radar jamming. In the event of inter-state conflict, electronic warfare platforms and capabilities developed by these and similar research institutes will be coordinated with computer network attack tools against key command and control nodes and networks for comprehensive "full spectrum attack," (meaning the five realms of air, sea, land, space and cyberspace) the report notes.
Cyber Security Policy at NASA, ESA and JAXA
The next part of this paper summarizes some of the approaches and responses by three main space agencies, NASA, ESA and JAXA, with a brief mention of some repose from industry.
NASA
NASA spends over $1.5 billion annually on its IT-related activities, including $58 million for IT security. NASA owns a little less than half of the U.S. government's non-Defense websites. There are approximately 3,400 NASA controlled websites and nearly 1,600 of these are linked to the outside world. There are an estimated 176,000 individual IP addresses assigned to NASA's IT systems and networks. NASA also possesses more than 120,000 computer or related devices located at its centers and facilities that are connected to the Agency's IT networks. NASA's IT assets includes more than 550 information systems and hundreds of thousands of individuals, including NASA personnel, contractors, academics, and members of the public use these IT systems.
Federal law and NASA policy designate the Headquarters-based Chief Information Officer (CIO) as responsible for developing IT security policies and procedures and implementing an Agency-wide IT security program. The Information Technology Security Advisory Board (ITSAB) serves as the main governing body for information security at NASA. The ITSAB consists of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and senior cybersecurity professionals from NASA Centers and Missions. NASA's IT Security Division is located in the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), which strategically manages Agency-wide security projects. It is joined by the Capital Planning & Governance Division which promotes the CIO's policies, principles, standards, and guidelines and the Technology and Innovation Division, led by the Chief Technology Officer for Information Technology, and guides NASA's IT strategy and investment decisions. The Enterprise Service and Integration Division is responsible for the design, implementation and delivery of NASA's Enterprise Architecture, infrastructure elements, networks, data centers, Web services, desktop PCs, and etc.
Evolution of NASA's cyber security response: To improve its capability to detect and respond to cyber threats, in November 2008 NASA consolidated its Center-based computer security incident detection and response programs into a single, Agency-wide computer security incident handling capability called the Security Operations Center (SOC) at Ames Research Center. SOC provides NASA with: (i) continuous NASA-wide incident monitoring and detection; (ii) security bulletins to share incident and threat information with NASA incident responders; (iii) a centralized Incident Management System for storing, managing, and reporting incidents internally externally (to OIG and the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team; and (iv) a hotline for reporting potential IT security incidents. In October 2011 NASA adopted an IT governance model to streamline decision making for strategic IT investments.
The NASA 2011 Strategic Plan: In February 2012, NASA CIO Linda Cureton released details NASA's 2011 Strategic Plan and the Agency's Information Resources Management (IRM) Strategic Plan which identified the Agency's IT goals next three to five years. NASA is focusing on: (i) improving its prediction, prevention and containment of IT security incidents; (ii) better identifying and protecting mission information targeted by adversaries such as nation-states, cyber criminals, and hackers; (ii) better integrating IT security solutions across NASA (iv) establishing a risk-based approach to managing IT security; (v) turning NASA's abilities to a predictive and preventative security stance rather than a reactive stance; (vi) improving the defense of the Agency's IT security posture and building security into the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC).
The strategy noted additional IT trends impacting the protection of NASA's IT infrastructure include cloud computing, social networking and Web 2.0+, the speed of technology changes, and mobile computing.
The NASA says it is scanning and remediating outstanding vulnerabilities on Internet-connected devices, has conducted a third-party external assessments of networks and implemented a Web Application Security Program. The Agency has correlated data for analysis of 130,000 connected devices to assess vulnerabilities and security patch status, identified and monitored mandatory critical security controls to continuously assess real-time vulnerabilities, and entered a two-year Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Energy to continue penetration test services of mission networks to identify network vulnerabilities and required credentialed scans to increase the detection of vulnerabilities on Internet-connected devices.
Regarding incident response, the NASA says it has completed a NASA-wide incident response handbook to standardize incident response procedures, updated an Incident Management System reporting tool to provide a greater ability to analyze and respond to incidents and instituted new technologies to better contain APTs.
It says it has also conducted internal program assessments using the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) planning tool to determine areas of improved alignment of enterprise IT security services. In addition the Agency has also developed a series of IT Security handbooks.
ESA
The European Space Agency is an International Organization promoting space research with about 30 sites interconnected by the ESACOM Wide Area Network covering 4,000 internal online users and over 10,000 external users. Space is now considered a basic element for the security of the European citizens. European Space Policy includes defence-security aspects and is building synergy between civilian and military activities, both terrestrial and space-based, with data of different security classification levels. ESA recognizes that key infrastructures providing access to and from space must be protected. This is covered by the EPCIP (European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection) directive, which says that access to/from space is considered among Europe's critical infrastructures.
Security elements targeted by the ESA Council include critical infrastructures protection, maritime and land surveillance, humanitarian crisis support and rescue tasks, public safety (incl. civil protection), as well as other emergent security threats (e.g., climate change) and security in space, namely Space Situational Awareness (SSA).
Evolution of cyber security strategy: ESA's cybersecurity policy during the 1990's, called INFOSEC, was driven by the huge growth of data flow combined with the growing complexity of interactions both externally and internally. ESA's modern cyber security strategy evolved from 1998 when it established its first initial network security policy, instituting firewalls between internal and external systems, and then setting more barriers between missions, leading to the setting up of subnets separating and protecting each Mission. ESA's security policy protects civil space mission types, commercial data dissemination, science mission experiment scheduling and data access, business, commerce and scientific assets.
ESACET and Security Office (SO): Reflecting the growing need for a specialized organization to deal with growing sophistication of cyber threats, cybercrime and cyberespionage, ESA evolved its cybersecurity institutions. This followed a long-term evolution of ESA policy from information security to cyber security and the emergence of classified systems, for example Galileo. In 2002 when ESA set up the ESACERT, with five full-time security analysts based at ESRIN, ESA's Centre for Earth Observation, in Frascati, Italy, to control incident response, as well as monitoring, warning and advisory function. ESACERT continually monitors ESA's IT service providers including Orange Business Services owned by France Telecom for ESA's corporate networks, vets all alarms and zero day attacks. In 2006 ESA set up its Security Office (SO) that was also located at ESRIN, as a separate function that defines the cybersecurity policy and procedures and controls its correct implementation.
DMZs and missions-based security: In ESA, missions and programs develop their own IT systems to support their programmatic goals, e.g., the Earth Observation Payload Data Ground Segment and the Galileo ground segment. Regarding access protocols, program-specific data systems are normally located in specific "De-Militarized zones" (DMZs) subject to specific access policies. ESA's current network security policy is structured in three principal layers; ESA's External Services Networks and de-militarized zones that connect with external networks, one layer deeper are ESA Internal Services Networks protected by firewalls, and at the innermost core are ESA Restricted Networks. There are about 4,000 end user devices, 1,000 data servers, served by a full class B of IP address spaces. While missions and programs develop their own specific data policies, each program must appoint a responsible security officer and ESA security officers are linked in a network of expertise and operationally linked, coordinated by an Infosec Officer in the Security Office.
Roles of ESACERT and SO: ESA's SO and ESACERT demarcate their roles. ESACERT conducts operational network monitoring and reacts to incidents. The SO sets the security policy for the Agency as a whole as well as for operational security systems (mission-related). The SO coordinates its work with a set of external controllers, including the Member States' national space agencies and national security authorities, who meet biannually in the ESA Security Committee, which is the specific Agency board ruling on security matters. The SO maintains a peer relationship with the European Union, having established a security agreement with the EU Council, the Commission, and the External Action Service.
The SO covers the traditional five pillars of security: physical (premises) protection, personnel, document and information protection, security of information and communication systems, and business continuity management. In its policy-setting role, the SO defines ESA's Security Regulations and Security Directives, technical solutions, like for example-the Network Security Policy and the rules for the Network Security Perimeter (firewalls), and conducts regular threat and risk assessment exercises, based on the ISO 27001 standards.
Modular Approach and ISO 27001: ESA takes a modular approach to security defined by objectives, scope, and methodology. IT security objectives define the security requirements applicable to all ESA IT and communications networks that store, process or transmit ESA information. ESA adopts a Principle of Information Assurance. All ESA ITC systems must protect ESA information under their control from unauthorized access, destruction or disclosure, with respect to the typical aspects of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudiation. All systems are eventually subject to ISO 27001 certification, requiring a cycle of risk assessment and countermeasures that are based on the establishment of ESA's own information security management system (ISMS). ESA therefore continually updates its response to risks through a PDCA loop. The Security Office performs regular audits and reserves the right to conduct specific audits on any systems at any time.
Threats: ESA characterizes cyber threats in terms of threats both its space and ground based systems and networks (organized in ground stations and control centers) including uplink jamming and replay, while threats to the ground installations include interception of data from the network or its users, malware or unauthorized access. ESA now recognizes social engineering, email-based key logging software or initiates phishing attacks and APTs as its main threats. ESA states its most common security incidents include viruses, trojans and worms distributed by amateur hackers, although some are now considered as targeted security attacks. ESA notes that several strategically important programs, particularly Galileo or GMES have generated more complex threats. ESA regards potential infiltration of critical infrastructures with software that can take over control of the facilities as a "future possible threat." It regards it main vulnerabilities as failures to update patches and weak passwords.
Response -Case study: the incident of April 2011: ESA follows up all security incidents carefully, noting that publicized intrusions may negatively affect its public reputation. On April 18, 2011, ESACERT was informed that TinKode had published an article stating that the ESA portal had been hacked, leading to widespread media interest. ESA immediately declared a severity 1 incident (the highest level of importance). After an initial review, ESACERT confirmed that 12 servers, all on ESA external DMZs had been affected. The systems were immediately disconnected cleaned, patched, all accounts were reset, and returned into operations. As only an external DMZ was affected, ESA said there was no data loss or leakage from protected internal networks. However ESA recognized that publication of the usernames and passwords represented a security breach. In response, ESA instituted a renewed rules verification process encrypting that all passwords.
From this incident, ESA maintains that its initial response was effective, but the incident exposed weaknesses in preventative measures since the hacked accounts were not protected according to ESA rules, concluding it should better identify escalation paths to responsible individuals, hold more technical coordination meetings to devise common solutions, and that common protection rules should be strengthened.
JAXA
In JAXA, IT policy and related issues are addressed by the Information System Department. JAXA's cybersecurity structure and control is largely the same as the structure inherited from the previous organization, the National Space Development Agency, from which JAXA was formed in 2003.
Organization and structure: A Security Administration Office (SAO) situated in the Tsukuba Space Center controls cybersecurity with a total of seven personnel under a director, which controls the overall setting of cybersecurity policy, management and compliance. The Director of the SAO reports to one of seven Executive Directors who is the Chief Security Officer. Day-to-day operations are managed by Security Control Administrators. These are usually directors or managers of JAXA departments, stationed in each of some 60 JAXA departments, who report IT security issues to SAO.
Conversely, the SAO checks and monitor compliance with the department security officers on a timely basis in response to changes in policy or procedures, compliance issues or threats. The SAO sets policy, management setting and compliance monitoring of the department-based security officers. Operational and day-to-day IT security is the responsibility of each department.
JAXA consists of roughly 60 departments, which are folded into several Directorates and Groups; the Space Transportation Mission Directorate, the Space Applications Mission Directorate, the Human Space Systems and Utilization Mission Directorate, the Aerospace Research and Development Directorate, the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), the Aviation Program Group (APG), the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Program Group and the Information Gathering Satellite Systems Development Group. JAXA's cybersecurity budget has risen in recent years, but the agency does not disclose spending, as these items are not specifically tracked.
Threats: JAXA does not provide specific details about the changing nature of the cybersecurity issues it faces, however the SAO acknowledge that threats are growing, that it is under constant attack. Against this SAO manages policy flexibly and proactively to change procedures both to forestall vulnerabilities and respond to the latest data on issues. The SAO conduct regular auditing, compliance and response to incidents as part of its cybersecurity policy setting on JAXA's departmentally based operational IT security management.
Oversight and policy: As an Independent Administrative Institution (dokuritsu gy sei h jin, or IAA) JAXA is a legal body for Japanese governmental organizations regulated by the Basic Law on Reforming Government Ministries of 1998. As such JAXA is not governed by the National Government Organization Act that controls Japanese Ministries and administrative organizations. Japanese IAAs utilize management methods of private-sector corporations and are given considerable autonomy in their operations and how to use their budgets.
JAXA's IT policy is described in the Medium Term Goal and subject to oversight and control of MEXT, but its cybersecurity policy is not defined concretely. JAXA's mid-term goal includes IT promotion and strengthening IT security, but it doesn't mention specific policies. Overall government standards for information security are not therefore directly applied to JAXA. However, according to JAXA's Law, all executives and employees shall not divulge any confidential information. JAXA Law Act 16 stipulates the duty of confidentiality, and it is not necessarily limited to IT security, but all kinds of information. JAXA describes its IT and security policies as "stakeholder driven" and formulated by the needs of both customers and international partners, including other space agencies (including NASA and ESA) and private contractors.
In regards to contracting with the private sector, JAXA describes its IT security management as stringently controlling and managing the IT security of organizations it contracts with rather than vice-versa. Contracts are managed to standards and policy that JAXA sets, rather than measures driven by contractors. JAXA also contracts outside IT specialists and IT security firms help it review and improve policy and implementation, and receives audits from outside IT specialists and companies on a needs basis.
While there is no legal requirement for JAXA to adhere to specific sets of IT governance or cybersecurity standards set in Japan, JAXA closely monitors a number of important national criteria and standards set by outside organizations, folding them into suites of best practices (see below).
Scale, scope, standards: JAXA does not disclose details about how many IT systems, information systems websites and IP addresses are assigned to its IT systems and networks. However, as it has about 1,700 full-time staff and several multiples of these on contract, the agency says that monitors and controls over 10,000 PCs, laptops and web-enabled digital devices. As well as intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems, which are updated on a needs basis, JAXA says it uses "a full range of controls" to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its networks and systems including identification and authentication of users; restricting user access to systems, encrypting network services and data, particularly laptops, protecting network boundaries, auditing and monitor computer-related events; physically protecting its information technology resources and controlling and regulating transmitted information between interconnected systems, etc.
Main standards and policy setting bodies and agencies include the National Security Information Center (NISC) which sets out standards and policy and revises each year. Other main standards setting organizations that JAXA monitors include IT security policy, standards and administration set by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), METI, and the Informationtechnology Promotion Agency (IPA).
Response from industry
This paper does not cover military assets, but notes that the U.S. has upgraded its Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) system to detect, characterize, geolocate and report sources of radio frequency interference on U.S. military and commercial satellites.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a growing market and demand for cybersecurity products for space systems.
In 2009, the U.S. National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee warned of the growing threat of unauthorized commanding of, or preventing control of routes, switches, services, databases or satellite buses. It warned that satellite networks would require special safety measures to prevent hackers from sending false commands, blocking authorized commands or interfering with data transmission, and recommended a joint coordinating center to share cyber situational awareness.
Commercial satellite companies established a test version of the center in April 2010, but reportedly this initiative is not making progress due to coordination difficulties between the private sector and U.S. government and military requirements and practices.
One example of commercial products are those by companies such as AI Solutions, another, is Kratos Defense & Security Solutions and its RT Logic subsidiary, which provides cyber protection for ground stations, satellite test equipment, and satellite operations through its CyberC4 products. According to RT Logic, the migration of satellite ground networks to IP-based technologies has brought brings along increased cyber security risks, particularly zero-day malware. RT logic sees zero-day malware as a main threat. IAA: In January 2012 the Aerospace Industries Association announced the National Aerospace Standard NAS9924, "Cyber Security Baseline," its first National Aerospace Standard written specifically on cyber security to provide the aerospace and defense industry supply chain a base line of standard practices they can follow to better protect their information system infrastructures from cyber threats. The standard provides information for companies to assess themselves on their information technology security practices and to help them determine their preparedness for cyber threat risk management for their customers while assessing the risks presented by their own suppliers.
Space Security Implications
Part five of this paper looks at some space security implications.
Space systems overlay cyber systems
As an example of the importance of the space and cyber realms to the global economy, this paper notes that governments, militaries and corporations around the world rely on space for communications, imagery, and accurate positioning services, making space a 257 billion dollar industry in 2008. Financial traders in New York City use the Internet to transfer 4 trillion dollars, greater than 25 percent of America's annual GDP, every day.
The space and cyber realms form a co-dependent ecosystem that covers a huge range of governance, technical, military strategic, & economic scenarios. The security of each system is to a degree contingent on the other. Strategists such as Richard A. Clarke have pointed out that the more reliant a country like the U.S. is on its digital economy and strategic space assets, the more vulnerable it might be. The very technologies that enable the U.S. to accelerate its economic, industrial, scientific and military advantages over other countries may well turn out to be its Achilles Heel. Take one example: space assets are a major force multiplier for the U.S. and a strategic asset that are at the same time incredibly valuable and vulnerable. General Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force believes passionately that space security depends on cyber security, itself contingent on data assurance.
The fears of a "Space Pearl Harbor" propounded by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld a decade ago have been replaced by concerns about a "Cyber Pearl Harbor" that reached public currency last year under former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta recognizing that the latter will probably contain the former.
Space systems resiliency and negation
Measures to protect space systems can be broadly categorized into capabilities to detect space negation attacks; physical and electronic means to withstand attacks on ground stations, communications links, and satellites and reconstitution and repair mechanisms to recover from space negation attacks, according to a definition provided in the "Space Security Index 2012," which cites cyber attacks against space system computers, electronic attacks on satellite communications links as threat to the security of space systems.
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The report noted that most space systems remain unprotected from a range of threats including electronic warfare, physical attacks on satellite ground stations, laser dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors, anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks (including direct-ascent and co-orbital ASATs and microsatellites ASATs and high altitude) but also pointed to the vulnerability of satellite communications, broadcast links, and ground stations as likely targets for cyber-based space negation efforts in the event of a conflict.
The vulnerability of such is compounded by the potential desirability of cyber attacks based on cyberwarfare's perceived asymmetrical advantages and the difficulty of detecting and identifying any form of cyber attack on space systems. Such vulnerabilities raise security concerns since military space actors are becoming increasingly dependent on commercial space assets, the vast majority of which depend on cyber networks. Therefore the report cited the link between cyberspace and outer space "constitutes a critical vulnerability."
Non-kinetic cyber-enabled threats
As summarized above, unlike traditionally recognized potential threats to degrade or destroy space assets, cyber attacks on space and satellite systems offer lower lower-cost, asymmetrical advantages to new actors, including hackers, terrorists, non-state groups or states. Cyber penetration of systems can include the means to degrade, damage or destroy space assets, counterfeit transmissions, gain access and leak imagery and other data collected by satellite sensors or compromise other terrestrial or space-based networks used by the satellite(s) or space systems. Without pervasive cyber situational awareness knowing the attacker's identity, affiliation, and location may be difficult.
The threat of non-kinetic cyber-enabled attacks to space systems has recently been more publicly recognized. For example by Air Force Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, former commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space believes the opening actions of a conflict will include cyber attacks on space assets. In effect, the fiction of Clarke is assumed as a future fact in the event of conflict.
The U.S. Air Force Space Command's Schriever Wargame 2010 explicitly refers to the growing threat of cyber attacks on space systems in its simulation of a global space and cyber war in year 2022 in which an adversary interfered with United States' and allied forces' cyber and space systems, degrading their air and naval operations.
"Designer satellite collisions." According to Jan Kallberg, cyber threats against space organizations or satellites present a new threat on top of traditional concerns. Just focusing on satellites, such assets are vulnerable since every transmission is a potential inlet for a cyber attack. Older satellites share technological similarities, providing opportunities to cyber-exploit industrial systems for control and processing and are built on SCADA systems with technology sometimes as far back as the 1980s. For example a satellite's onboard computer (OBC) can allow reconfiguration and software updates, and a vulnerable satellite that will be orbiting for the next 10 years can be preset by a cyber perpetrator for unauthorized usage when needed. Kallberg envisages a cyber attack on a less protected commercial satellite resulting in a space collision that would be difficult to attribute. Such a strategy would present an "attractive target" to an adversary by simulating, for example a "designer" collision masked as an accident that was in fact resulting in hijacking the asset by a cyber attack perpetrated through reconfiguration of an OBC of a less technically advanced third party nation, commercial or research organization.
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Some policy and technical responses
While this paper does not deal with space law, cyber threats in space also pose new and difficult legal and policy issues. As with other debates on cyberwar vs. kinetic war, it is unclear what constitutes an "armed attack" for the purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter in terms of a cyber attack on a space asset. It is apparent that non-kinetic threats pose difficult issues for the definitions of "due regard" and "harmful interference" in the Outer Space Treaty and "purposeful interference" in the United States' National Space Policy (see next). As it is, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty has never been formally invoked for satellite jamming and debris-generating ASAT testing. It is also unclear what constitutes an "armed attack" for the purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter in terms of a cyber attack. International Telecommunication Union rules on "harmful interference" for example only apply to radiocommunication satellites, not to all spacecraft.
However, recent policy has been forced to start addressing cyber threats to space assets. As noted by the authors of "Space Security 2012," and others, the ability of space systems to deny an adversary the benefits of a cyber or more conventional attack is a key concern for advanced spacefaring nations. Efforts to both improve military and non-military space assets and improve identification and reporting of sources of interference with space systems and improve robustness after attacks may help deter cyber attacks.
Some U.S. policy initiatives
On the policy level, more concerted efforts are being made to address cybersecurity issues in space, reflecting the fact that while improved cyber defenses may stimulate arms escalation, improved cybersecurity may reduce the escalatory logic of employing cyberwar against space assets. In light of this, a number of new initiatives that acknowledge the increasing importance of cybersecurity and space have emerged that now reflect the importance of the symbiotic connections between space and cyber security. Here is a summary of some key initiatives:
1) The United States 2010 National Space Policy refers to right to deter others from interference and attack, inferring the recognition of the possibility of cyber attacks.
2) In January 2011 the United States National Security Space Strategy, which includes this strategic objective: "to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantage afforded to the United States by space." The Strategy states that "resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space system protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in various orbits, drawing on distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and developing and maturing responsive space capabilities."
3) The 2011 Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace is more explicit saying DoD will "work with interagency and international partners to encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuade and deter malicious actors, and reserve the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate." 4) In February 2011 Admiral M.G. Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, released the U.S. National Military Strategy, noting the U.S.'s need "to operate effectively in space and cyberspace, in particular, is increasingly essential to defeating aggression."
The strategy includes aims at establishing and promoting norms, enhancing space situational awareness, fostering transparency and cooperation, improving and resiliency of systems, and training for operations in space-degraded environments.
5) In May 2011 the United States launched the International Strategy for Cyberspace, which provides a framework to expand international partnerships in order to more effectively address cyber threats. The strategy "establishes how network security relates to other crucial areas of partnerships."
Conclusions
There is strong circumstantial evidence of attempts to conduct sustained cyber espionage with the possibility of precursors of cyberwar in attacks in IT systems that control space assets in world's space agencies. Evidence for this is driven by the publicly disclosed issues faced by NASA, but the weight of evidence from what is made public about APTs against high-value institutions strongly suggests that like other high value, high technology, strategically important assets, JAXA and ESA similarly besieged by similar attacks. NASA may be seen to be in a constant catch-up mode driven by both external and internal auditing of its systems, protocols and security measures. In ESA, the development of national security programs, particularly Galileo has driven the Agency to radically overhaul its security measures, primarily through the creation of its Security Office in 2006. While declining to be specific, the Agency confirms that it is facing increased APT attacks, but is dealing with these. The most major publicly disclosed breach of its systems in 2011 did not result in the disclosure of sensitive information and the Agency says it is committed to openness regarding cybersecurity breaches, noting that its policies have been transformed by a culture of maintaining information security to one of combatting increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks, including APTs. There is circumstantial evidence following disclosures of attacks in 2011 onwards that JAXA has been targeted by waves of increasingly sophisticated APTs that have emerged after 2010 in line with attacks on leading Japanese governmental, research and industrial institutions.
The co-dependent and complex interrelationships between the cyber and realm and space realms, with their associated economic, infrastructural and military strengths and vulnerabilities are posing new problems for both space and cyberspace policy and governance that are pressing policy evolution and that need to be addressed comprehensively.
